Signaling in Political Budget Cycles: How Far Are You Willing to Go?
A key assumption in the literature on political cycles with rational voters and opportunistic politicians is that opportunism is common knowledge. In this framework, political cycles have been interpreted as a signal of competency. However, if opportunism is not common knowledge, cycles may no longer indicate competency, but rather opportunism. This is because highly opportunistic incumbents are willing to go farther to be reelected. Since political cycles require discretionality to reallocate budget items, a decrease of discretionality curbs cycles. It may also make elections more effective at selecting competent incumbents. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Inc..
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | STREB, JORGE MIGUEL |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 7.2005, 2, p. 229-252
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Publisher: |
Association for Public Economic Theory - APET |
Saved in:
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