Signaling in Political Cycles : How Far are You Willing to Go?

Previous results on political cycles as a signal of competency assumed that opportunism was common knowledge. If opportunism is not common knowledge, there may be a partially pooling equilibrium where cycles indicate opportunism rather than competency. Insofar as more discretionality increases the asymmetry of information, the possibility of cycles increases, and elections may become less effective to select competent incumbents

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Year of publication:	[2007]
Authors:	Streb, Jorge M.
Publisher:	[2007]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Signalling \| Politischer Konjunkturzyklus \| Political business cycle

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (32 p)
Series:	Universidad del CEMA Working Paper ; No. 193
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 2002 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1026405 [DOI]
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; E6 - Macroeconomic Policy Formation, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, Macroeconomic Policy, and General Outlook
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012728709