Signalling Aspects of Managers' Incentives.

This paper analyses a signalling model of managers' promotion from divisions to the CEO position, in both cases of a monopoly and a duopoly. Explicit and implicit incentives in the presence of asymmetric information are shown to induce managers to increase effort in order to signal high ability to owners, therby raising their probability of promotion.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Labory, S
Institutions:	Department of Economics, European University Institute
Subject:	OLIGOPOLIES \| INFORMATION \| WAGES

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Series:	Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	38 pages
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005697755