Signalling, screening and costly misrepresentation
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Deneckere, Raymond J. ; Severinov, Sergei |
Published in: |
The Canadian journal of economics : the journal of the Canadian Economics Association. - Oxford [u.a.] : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1540-5982, ZDB-ID 2013251-7. - Vol. 55.2022, 3, p. 1334-1370
|
Subject: | Signalling | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Kosten | Costs | Theorie | Theory |
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