Silence can be golden : on the value of allowing managers to keep silent when information is soft
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Versano, Tsahi |
Published in: |
Journal of accounting & economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4101, ZDB-ID 441330-1. - Vol. 71.2021, 2/3, p. 1-19
|
Subject: | Bonus schemes | Mandatory disclosure | Reliability | Soft information | Verifiability | Voluntary disclosure | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Informationswert | Information value | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Öffentlichkeitsarbeit | Public relations | Theorie | Theory | Auskunftspflicht | Disclosure regulation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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