Simple relational contracts and the dynamics of social capital
Year of publication: |
2024
|
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Authors: | Leduc, Mathieu V. |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1090-2473, ZDB-ID 1467668-0. - Vol. 145.2024, p. 27-53
|
Subject: | Principal-agent problems | Repeated games | Shock persistence | Simple relational contracts | Social capital | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Sozialkapital | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Wiederholte Spiele | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Schock | Shock | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
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