Simultaneous screening and college admissions

We analyze a simultaneous screening problem in competition among top schools. The model predicts that when the second best school has similar prestige to the best one it could attract better students by choosing the same entrance examination date.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Chen, Wei-Cheng ; Kao, Yi-Cheng
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 122.2014, 2, p. 296-298
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Decentralized two-sided matching \| Early decision \| School competition

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; I23 - Higher Education Research Institutions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743710