Single dimensional linear and forcing contracts : did targets and bonuses cause the collapse of the Soviet economy?
Year of publication: |
1991
|
---|---|
Authors: | Qeren, Mîḵā'ēl |
Published in: |
Economic systems. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0939-3625, ZDB-ID 1072886-7. - Vol. 15.1991, 1, p. 19-41
|
Subject: | Zentrale Wirtschaftsplanung | Central planning | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertrag | Contract | Sowjetunion | USSR |
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