Single versus multiple-prize all-pay auctions to finance public goods: An experimental analysis
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Faravelli, Marco ; Stanca, Luca |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 8643210. - Vol. 81.2012, 2, p. 677-689
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