Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations
Year of publication: |
September 2017
|
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Authors: | Levine, David K. ; Modica, Salvatore |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 49.2017, p. 71-83
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Subject: | Organization | Group | Collusion | Public good | Interessenpolitik | Lobbying | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Theorie | Theory | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition |
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