Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games.

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Year of publication:	2011-07
Authors:	Dimitrov, Dinko ; Sung, Shao Chin
Institutions:	Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Core \| Hedonic Games \| Monotonicity \| Stable Sets

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 2011.52
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009189885