Slowdown Antitrust Investigations by Decentralization

When multi-product firms make simultaneous price-fixing agreements in different markets, the introduction of leniency programs may induce firms to compartmentalize their activities. Doing so results in slowdown antitrust investigations and decentralized ﬁrm can easily request leniency for a second cartel after the detection of an other. We study how variation of fine reduction may produce procompetitive but also procollusive effects

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Dargaud, Emilie
Other Persons:	Jacques, Armel (contributor)
Publisher:	[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Kartellrecht \| Antitrust law \| Dezentralisierung \| Decentralization \| Wettbewerbspolitik \| Competition policy

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (30 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 20, 2020 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3606082 [DOI]
Classification:	K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833515