Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Foster, Dean P. ; Hart, Sergiu |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 109.2018, p. 271-293
|
Subject: | Calibration | Deterministic calibration | Finite recall | Fixed points | Nash dynamics | Smooth calibration | Theorie | Theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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