Social choice with analytic preferences
Arrow's axioms for social welfare functions are shown to be inconsistent when the set of alternatives is the nonnegative orthant in a multidimensional Euclidean space and preferences are assumed to be either the set of analytic classical economic preferences or the set of Euclidean spatial preferences. When either of these preference domains is combined with an agenda domain consisting of compact sets with nonempty interiors, strengthened versions of the Arrovian social choice correspondence axioms are shown to be consistent. To help establish the economic possibility theorem, an ordinal version of the Analytic Continuation Principle is developed.
Year of publication: |
2002-07-08
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Authors: | Breton, Michel Le ; Weymark, John A. |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 19.2002, 3, p. 637-657
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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