Social Effects in a Multi-Agent Investment Game. An Experimental Analysis
We experimentally investigate social effects in a principal-agent setting with incomplete contracts. The strategic interaction scheme is based on the Investment Game (Berg et al., 1995). In our setting four trustees and one trustor are interacting and the access to choices of peers in the group of trustees is experimentally manipulated. We find that when the trust- worthiness of some participants is made available to peers, the high levels of trustworthiness displayed by those being observed tend to negatively impact on the trustworthiness of those observing them.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Mittone, Luigi ; Ploner, Matteo |
Institutions: | Dipartimento di Economia e Management, Università degli Studi di Trento |
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