Social norms, regulation, and environmental risk

We add social norms into Laffont’s mechanism designed for environmental risk. We find with endogenous social norms and asymmetric information about personal norms, the optimal contract induces more (less) effort from the “green” (“brown”) firm.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Qin, Botao ; Shogren, Jason F.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 129.2015, C, p. 22-24
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Mechanism design \| Social norms \| Environmental risk

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; Q52 - Pollution Control Costs; Distributional Effects ; Q58 - Government Policy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263422