Social Preferences and Fairness Norms as Informal Institutions: Experimental Evidence
We conduct a series of dictator games in which the status of the dictator relative to other players varies across treatments. Experiments are conducted in a conventional university lab and in villages in rural Kenya. We find that status is an important determinant of dictator game giving, but the relative importance of earned and unearned status differs across cultures.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Jakiela, Pamela |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 101.2011, 3, p. 509-13
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Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
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