Social Preferences and Public Economics: Are good laws a substitute for good citizens?

Laws and policies designed to harness self-regarding preferences to public ends may fail when they compromise the beneficial effects of pro-social preferences. Experimental evidence indicates that incentives that appeal to self interest may reduce the salience of intrinsic motivation, reciprocity, and other civic motives. Motivational crowding in also occurs. The evidence for these processes is reviewed and a model of optimal explicit incentives is presented.

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Year of publication:	2007-01
Authors:	Bowles, Samuel
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Statistics, Facoltà di Economia "Richard M. Goodwin"
Subject:	Social preferences \| implementation theory \| incentive contracts \| incomplete contracts \| framing \| behavioral experiments \| motivational crowding out \| ethical norms \| constitutions

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Department of Economics University of Siena.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D64 - Altruism ; D52 - Incomplete Markets ; H41 - Public Goods ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766529