Social preferences can make imperfect sanctions work: Evidence from a public good experiment
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Engel, Christoph |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 108.2014, C, p. 343-353
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Imperfect sanctions | Punishment | Inequity aversion | Social value orientation |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Classification: | C33 - Models with Panel Data ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles ; H41 - Public Goods ; K13 - Tort Law and Product Liability ; K14 - Criminal Law |
Source: |
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Deterrence by imperfect sanctions: A public good experiment
Engel, Christoph, (2013)
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Deterrence by Imperfect Sanctions – A Public Good Experiment
Engel, Christoph, (2013)
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Deterrence by Imperfect Sanctions – A Public Good Experiment
Engel, Christoph, (2013)
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Bargaining in the absence of property rights: An experiment
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If the worst comes to the worst: Dictator giving when recipient´s endowments are risky
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