Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Campbell, Donald E. ; Kelly, Jerry S. |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 51.2006, 1, p. 81-89
|
Subject: | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule |
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