Social Welfare Functions that Satisfy Pareto, Anonymity, and Neutrality: Countable Many Alternatives

For a finite number of alternatives, in the presence of Pareto, non-dictatorship, full domain, and transitivity, an extremely weak independence condition is incompatible with each of anonymity and neutrality (Campbell and Kelly [2006]). This paper explores how those results are affected when there are countably many alternatives.

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Year of publication:	2006-09-11
Authors:	Campbell, Donald E. ; Kelly, Jerry S.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, College of William & Mary
Subject:	Pareto \| anonymity \| neutrality

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 43 15 pages
Classification:	D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588182