Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden?

This article considers a bilateral externality problem, in which injurers and victims choose activity levels and levels of care. The incentive effects of liability rules and fines for harm done are analyzed. It is shown that in general socially optimal behaviour can only be induced if fines are imposed. However, if collusion between the injurer and the victim is possible, we cannot achieve more with the help of fines than with liability rules alone.

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Schmitz, Patrick W.
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftswissenschaften 3.48(1997): pp. 351-360
Classification:	K1 - Basic Areas of Law
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005616843