Solution concepts for games with general coalitional structure

We introduce a theory of marginal values and their core stability for cooperative games with transferable utility and arbitrary set systems representing the set of feasible coalitions. The theory is based on the notion of strictly nested sets in a set system. For each maximal strictly nested set, we define a unique marginal contribution vector. Using these marginal contribution vectors several solutions concepts are introduced.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Koshevoy, Gleb ; Talman, Dolf
Published in:	Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 68.2014, C, p. 19-30
Publisher:	Elsevier

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744324