Sorting the Good Guys from Bad : On the Optimal Audit Structure with Ex-Ante Information Acquisition
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Menichini, Anna Maria C. |
Other Persons: | Simmons, Peter J. (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Optimale Besteuerung | Optimal taxation | Qualifikation | Occupational qualification |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Economic Theory, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2014 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 2014 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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