Sorting with Motivated Agents: Implications for School Competition and Teacher Incentives

This paper proposes a simple framework to study incentives and matching in the market for teachers. The framework is used to investigate the consequences of introducing incentive pay for teachers when contracts have both a matching and an incentive effect. Our analysis suggests that school competition and teacher incentives cannot be studied in isolation from one another. (JEL: D73, I20, J45, L31 (c) 2006 by the European Economic Association.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Besley, Timothy ; Ghatak, Maitreesh
Published in:	Journal of the European Economic Association. - MIT Press. - Vol. 4.2006, 2-3, p. 404-414
Publisher:	MIT Press

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005690505