Spatially Oligopolistic Models with Cournot Producers and Regulated Transportation Prices
An oligopoly with spatially dispersed producers and consumers and with multi-period demands is modeled in the paper. The producers are assumed to behave in a Cournot manner with regulated transportation prices. The story of the game is as follows: each producer takes its rivals' outputs (generation, supply, and flows) and the prices for transportation services as fixed when it decides upon its output to maximize its profit; the transportation firms take the quantities of transportation services demanded by the producers as fixed when they determine the transportation prices through certain regulations. An equilibrium of the model is a set of the producers' outputs at which no producer will obtain more profit if it unilaterally modifies its output from this set, and a set of transportation prices satisfying certain regulatory requirements. Variational inequality and nonlinear complementarity approaches are used for computing equilibria of the model. This model and its two variants are applied to simulate a long run electricity market where transmission prices are regulated.
Year of publication: |
1996-05-01
|
---|---|
Authors: | WEI, Jing-Yuan ; SMEERS, Yves |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Spatial oligopolistic electricity models with Cournot generators and regulated transmission prices
WEI, Jing-Yuan,
-
Spatial oligopolistic electricity models with Cournot generators and regulated transmission prices
WEI, Jing-Yuan,
-
Do we need a power exchange if there are enough power marketers ?
SMEERS, Yves, (1997)
- More ...