Specific human capital, monitoring costs and the organization of work
Year of publication: |
1996
|
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Authors: | Garen, John E. |
Published in: |
Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE. - Tübingen : Mohr Siebeck, ISSN 0932-4569, ZDB-ID 232799-5. - Vol. 152.1996, 3, p. 495-518
|
Subject: | Humankapital | Human capital | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Geldwerter Vorteil | Non-monetary incentives | Theorie | Theory |
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