Speed and quality of collective decision making: Incentives for information provision
Abstract We study a one-shot information aggregation problem in which agents have to provide effort in order to understand the information they are supposed to process. Agents have a common interest in reaching a good decision but suffer from an individual cost of providing effort. Showing that any problem which is incentive compatible for a single information processor is incentive compatible for a decentralized organization, but not vice versa, we derive a new rationale for decentralized information processing. For a class of problems, the fastest organization - the reduced tree proposed by Radner (1993) - yields also the best incentives for information processing.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | GrĂ¼ner, Hans Peter ; Schulte, Elisabeth |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 76.2010, 3, p. 734-747
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Information processing Hierarchies Incentives for information provision |
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