Split-award procurement auctions : can Bayesian equilibrium strategies predict human bidding behavior in multi-object auctions?
Martin Bichler; Kemal Guler; Stefan Mayer
| Year of publication: |
2015
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Bichler, Martin ; Güler, Kemal ; Mayer, Stefan |
| Published in: |
Production and operations management : an international journal of the Production and Operations Management Society. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1059-1478, ZDB-ID 1108460-1. - Vol. 24.2015, 6, p. 1012-1027
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| Subject: | procurement | multi-object auction | Bayes Nash equilibrium | risk-aversion | experiment | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Beschaffung | Procurement | Auktion | Auction | Experiment | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296723