Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions : a case of tacit collusion
Year of publication: |
2023
|
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Authors: | Fan, Cuihong ; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn ; Wolfstetter, Elmar |
Published in: |
Economic theory bulletin. - Cham : Springer Internat. Publ., ISSN 2196-1093, ZDB-ID 2733052-7. - Vol. 11.2023, 2, p. 255-275
|
Subject: | Auctions | Espionage | Incomplete information | Second-mover advantage | Signaling | Tacit collusion | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Unvollkommene Information | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Signalling | Kartell | Cartel | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game |
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