Spying in Bertrand markets under incomplete information : who benefits and is it stable?
Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter
| Year of publication: |
2022
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Fan, Cuihong ; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn ; Wolfstetter, Elmar |
| Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 102.2022, p. 1-8
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| Subject: | Bertrand games | Corporate espionage | Incomplete information | Stackelberg games | Value of information in games | Unvollkommene Information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Duopol | Duopoly | Informationswert | Information value |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2022.102722 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013539349