Stabilisation et transparence. La règle budgétaire de Taylor et le Pacte de stabilité

This paper evaluates the strength of automatic fiscal stabilizers in European countries by applying to the EU countries Taylor (2000)?'s methodology, which relates the budget balance to the output gap and the structural budget balance. Estimates are provided for the EU and for each of the EU members. Furthermore, we ask whether this « Taylor?'s fiscal rule » can be considered as a guide for national fiscal policies under EMU, in relation with the recent proposals made by the European Commission. Using the estimated fiscal policy rules in individual EU countries, we compute the structural budget position compatible with a balanced total budget position, given the size of the automatic stabilizers and the behaviour of the output gap. We then evaluate the stance of discretionary fiscal policies consistent with the requirement of a balanced budget. In our opinion, Taylor?'s fiscal rule also increases transparency in public governance.JEL codes : E62, E63, H62.