Stability and Deterrence Through Strategic Nuclear Arms
A quantitative simulation is carried out in order to test the political outcome of ABM and MIRVs. Technical variables serve as input: number of ICBMs, of ABMs, hit probabilities, etc. Strategic positions result as output: mutual second strike capability, effective defense of one power only, etc. The conclusion is that MIRVs, especially in com bination with ABMs, represent an extreme threat to equilibrium.
Year of publication: |
1973
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Authors: | Afheldt, Horst ; Sonntag, Philipp |
Published in: |
Journal of Peace Research. - Peace Research Institute Oslo. - Vol. 10.1973, 3, p. 245-250
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Publisher: |
Peace Research Institute Oslo |
Saved in:
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