Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Finus, Michael ; van Ierland, Ekko ; Dellink, Rob |
Publisher: |
Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |
Subject: | Klimaschutz | Umweltabkommen | Koalition | Kartell | Theorie | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | International environmental agreements | Kyoto-Protocol | Cartel formation game | Non-cooperative game theory |
Series: | Nota di Lavoro ; 61.2003 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/118095 [Handle] RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.61 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; H41 - Public Goods ; Q25 - Water |
Source: |
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Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game
Finus, Michael, (2003)
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Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game
Finus, Michael, (2003)
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Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game
Finus, Michael, (2003)
- More ...
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Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game
Finus, Michael, (2003)
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Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game
Finus, Michael, (2003)
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Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game
Finus, Michael, (2006)
- More ...