Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games
Year of publication: |
2020
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Authors: | Chander, Parkash |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 49.2020, 4, p. 953-973
|
Subject: | Oligopoly | Cartel | Monopoly | Partition function game | Core | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Koalition | Coalition | Oligopol | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Kartell | Monopol |
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