Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
Year of publication: |
January 2018
|
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Authors: | Han, Xiang |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 107.2018, p. 1-20
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Subject: | Group strategy-proofness | House allocation | Housing market | Indivisible object | Priority | Stability | Allokation | Allocation | Unteilbare Güter | Indivisible goods | Wohnungsmarkt | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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