Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games.

We prove the existence of subsidy free and sustainable pricing schedule in multiproduct contestable markets. We allow firms to discriminate the local markets that are composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Results are obtained under an assumption of fair sharing cost and under boundary condition of demand functions. The pricing problem is modelled in terms of equilibrium-core allocations of parameterized cost games.

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Iehlé, Vincent
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	Subventions croisées \| Jeux de coût paramétrés \| Cooperative game \| Contestable markets \| Sustainability \| Subsidy free prices \| Parametrized cost game \| Jeux coopératifs \| Marchés contestables \| Soutenabilité

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Cahiers de la MSE, Série bleue, 2004
Classification:	L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905384