Stackelberg mixed oligopoly with asymmetric subsidies

In a mixed oligopoly, when the public leader becomes a private leader and the government provides output subsidies, then privatization causes the optimal subsidy, profits and welfare to fall [Economics Letters 83 (2004) 411]. We show instead that if the leader and the followers receive asymmetric, rather than symmetric subsidies, the first-best optimum can be restored. In this case, privatization bears no consequences on the followers' subsidy, output and welfare.

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Year of publication:	2007-06-21
Authors:	Zikos, Vasileios
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 12.2007, 13, p. 1-5
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	L0 - Industrial Organization. General ; L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836200