Standards of behavior and time generate tacit cooperation in a hierarchical relationship
Year of publication: |
1992
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kramarz, Francis |
Other Persons: | Ponssard, Jean-Pierre (contributor) |
Published in: |
Annales d'économie et de statistique. - Amiens [u.a.] : ADRES, ISSN 0769-489X, ZDB-ID 635036-7. - 1992, p. 251-263
|
Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Sozialpsychologie | Social psychology | Theorie | Theory |
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