Status In Markets
This project tests for the effect of social status in a laboratory experimental market. We consider a special "box design" market in which a vertical overlap in supply and demand ensure that there are multiple equilibrium prices. We manipulate the relative social status of our subjects by awarding high status to a subset of the group based on one of two procedures. In the first, a subject's score on a trivia quiz determines his or her status; in another, subjects are assigned randomly to a higher-status or lower-status group. In both treatments we find that average prices are higher in markets where higher-status sellers face lowerstatus buyers, and lower when buyers have higher status than sellers. Across all sessions, the higher-status side of the market captures a greater share of the surplus, earning significantly more than their lower-status counterparts. © 2000 the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Ball, Sheryl ; Eckel, Catherine ; Grossman, Philip J. ; Zame, William |
Published in: |
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. - MIT Press. - Vol. 116.2001, 1, p. 161-188
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Publisher: |
MIT Press |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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