Stealth compensation : do CEOs increase their pay by influencing dividend policy?
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Minnick, Kristina ; Rosenthal, Leonard |
Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 25.2014, p. 435-454
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Subject: | Executive compensation | Payout policy | Firm performance | Corporate governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Corporate Governance | Dividende | Dividend | Managervergütung | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Unternehmenserfolg | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Lohn | Wages |
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