Stereotypical Behavior vs. Expectations : Gender Differences in a Dictator Game

Gender differences have frequently been studied in experimental economics, but the findings remain inconclusive. In this study, we focus on gender differences in expectations and economic behavior in a dictator game, building on Blanckenburg, Iseke and Tebbe (2023). We add to prior work by differentiating between stereotypical behavior and stereotypical expectations. Accordingly, we extended the classic dictator game by three steps in order to study whether recipients develop stereotypical beliefs regarding the dictator’s gender based on the amount of money the dictator has allocated to them. First, we asked recipients to estimate the amount. We then revealed the amount the dictator actually allocated to the recipient and finally, we asked the recipient to assess the dictator’s gender. Based on previous results which show no gender differences regarding the amount the dictators allocate, we find evidence for stereotypical expectations of the recipients based on the amount the dictator allocates to them