Sticky matching in school choice
Year of publication: |
October 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz ; Aliog̃ulları, Zeynel Harun ; Barlo, Mehmet |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 64.2017, 3, p. 509-538
|
Subject: | Sticky-stability | Stickiness degree | Efficiency-improving deferred-acceptance mechanism | Efficiency-corrected deferred-acceptance mechanism | Deferred-acceptance mechanism | Manipulation | Theorie | Theory | Schulauswahl | School choice | Matching |
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