Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games with Multiple Populations
Year of publication: |
2009-01
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Authors: | Maruta, Toshimasa ; Okada, Akira |
Institutions: | Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University |
Subject: | Equilibrium selection | stochastic stability | unanimity game | coordination game |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Number 2009-01 20 pages long |
Classification: | C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General |
Source: |
-
Multiple Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games
Maruta, Toshimasa, (2006)
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Multiplicity and Sensitivity of Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games
Maruta, Toshimasa, (2007)
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Equilibrium Selection with Payoff-Dependent Mistakes
Yi, Kang-Oh, (2011)
- More ...
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The Formation and Long-run Stability of Cooperative Groups in a Social Dilemma Situation
Maruta, Toshimasa, (2014)
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Group Formation and Heterogeneity in Collective Action Games
Maruta, Toshimasa, (2005)
-
Multiple Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games
Maruta, Toshimasa, (2006)
- More ...