Stop-and-Go Agricultural Policies
The optimal design of farm policy and public investment in agriculture in the presence of asymmetric information between the government and farmers is studied. It is shown that a mix of capped deficiency payments and voluntary paid land diversion can implement the optimal policy outcome. Optimal program design requires large farmers to farm all their land, and small farmers may or may not divert acreage. Decoupled policies are never optimal. Copyright 2000, Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Bourgeon, Jean-Marc ; Chambers, Robert G. |
Published in: |
American Journal of Agricultural Economics. - Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA. - Vol. 82.2000, 1, p. 1-13
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Publisher: |
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association - AAEA |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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