Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom's Third Generation Spectrum Auction
This article studies bidding behaviour in the auction of radio spectrum for third generation mobile telephone services which took place in the UK in the Spring of 2000. We show that several companies' bidding behaviour deviates strongly from straightforward bidding with private values. In particular some companies' evaluation of the added advantage of having a large licence rather than a small licence seemed to change dramatically during the auction. No compelling explanation of this phenomenon seems available at this stage. We conclude that it is less well understood than previously believed how spectrum auctions work. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | Börgers, Tilman ; Dustmann, Christian |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 115.2005, 505, p. 551-578
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
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