Strategic aspects of fighting in alliances

This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members' effort contributions, the role of budget constraints, the role of information transfer inside the alliance, and the role of in-group favoritism.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Konrad, Kai A.
Publisher:	Berlin : Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Subject:	Alliances \| contests \| conflict \| in-group favoritism

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Series:	WZB Discussion Paper ; SP II 2011-105
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	682496022 [GVK] hdl:10419/54590 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:SPII2011105 [RePEc]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307683