Strategic Campaigns and Redistributive Politics
The article investigates strategic, informative campaigning by two parties when politics concern redistribution. Voters are uncertain about whether parties favour special groups. Parties will target campaigns on groups where most votes are gained by informing about policies. In equilibrium, campaigning will be most intensive in groups where the uncertainty is largest and where voters are most mobile, most likely to vote, most receptive to campaigns and relatively uninformed initially. These groups will become more informed about policy. Parties will therefore gain more votes by treating these groups well so these groups will gain from strategic campaigning. Welfare effects are assessed. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | Schultz, Christian |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 117.2007, 522, p. 936-963
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
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