Strategic Complexity in Repeated Extensive Games
This paper studies a two-player machine (finite automaton) game in which an extensive game with perfect information is infinitely repeated. We introduce a new measure of strategic complexity named "multiple complexity", which considers the responsiveness of a strategy to information as well as the number of states of machines. In contrast to Piccione and Rubinstein (1993), we prove that a machine game may include non-trivial Nash equilibria. In the sequential-move prisoners' dilemma, cooperation can be sustained in an equilibrium of the machine game.
Year of publication: |
2006-11
|
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Authors: | Muto, Nozomu |
Institutions: | Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University |
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