Strategic Defense and Attack for Series and Parallel Reliability Systems: Rejoinder

In our original comment, we showed that Hausken's characterization of Nash equilibrium is invalid for much of the parameter space examined and provided necessary conditions for his solution to hold. Most of the comments in his reply are either tangential or irrelevant. However, several of the claims made in the reply reveal continuing misunderstandings and gaps in his understanding. In this rejoinder, we brie y clarify the fundamental issues.

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Year of publication:	2012-01
Authors:	Kovenock, Dan ; Roberson, Brian
Institutions:	Krannert School of Management, Purdue University
Subject:	Game theory \| OR in military \| Con ict \| Contest \| Network \| Colonel Blotto game

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Purdue University Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	43 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; H56 - National Security and War
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009422084